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 Conventional wisdom holds that law and economics is either embryonic or 
nonexistent outside of the United States generally and in civil-law jurisdictions in 
particular. Existing explanations for the assumed lack of interest in the application of 
economic reasoning to legal problems range from the different structure of legal 
education and academia outside of the United States to the peculiar characteristics of 
civilian legal systems. This paper challenges this view by documenting and explaining 
the growing use of economic reasoning by Brazilian courts. We argue that, given the 
ever-greater role of courts in the formulation of public policy, the application of legal 
principles and rules increasingly calls for a theory of human behavior (such as that 
provided by economics) to help foresee the likely consequences of different legal 
regimes. Consistent with the traditional role of civilian legal scholarship in providing 
guidance for the practice of law, the further development of law and economics in 
Brazil is therefore likely to be mostly driven by judicial demand. 
 
I. Introduction   
It is difficult to overstate the influence of the law and economics movement on U.S. 
law.3 Yet, in contrast to numerous instances of U.S. legal imperialism during the twentieth 
century4 – culminating in what is sometimes referred to as the “Americanization of law”5 
around the globe –, the diffusion of law and economics elsewhere has apparently proceeded 
at a far slower pace.6 Divergent attitudes toward legal science and practice,7 the alleged 
singularity of American ideology,8 the lack of mathematical and economic skills among 
civilian legal scholars,9 language barriers and inertia,10 the power of U.S. courts,11 
academic incentives for law professors,12 protectionism within the legal 
profession,13 misconceptions about the comparative method,14 Marxist domination of 
economics faculties,15 and cultural differences16 have emerged as the likely culprits for the 
aversion to economic analysis of law in civil-law countries. Conventional wisdom 
accordingly holds that judges outside of the United States are impervious to economic 
reasoning in reaching their decisions.17 
 At least in Brazil, however, the perceived insulation of legal practice from 
economic reasoning is plainly mistaken. To be sure, although law and economics 
scholarship in Brazil is rapidly gaining ground,18 it admittedly remains far from dominant. 
Perhaps surprisingly, most of the action in integrating economic and legal reasoning has 
not taken place within the Ivory Tower, but outside of it.  
Unbeknownst even to most educated observers,19 courts have taken the lead in 
employing economic principles to illuminate the application of the law. Those who decry 
the resistance to economic analysis in Brazil may simply have been looking at the wrong 




product of blind imitation of foreign fads, but rather the result of a profound transformation 
in the character and operation of the Brazilian legal system.  
This essay proceeds as follows. Part II defines what we mean by the use of 
economic reasoning in Brazilian courts. Part III documents and analyzes the use of 
economic reasoning in paradigmatic judicial decisions by Brazil’s higher courts. Part IV 
outlines the ideological, political, and legal factors that have effectively spurred judicial 
demand for economic insights in the adjudication of legal disputes. Part V concludes by 
suggesting implications of these developments for legal education and scholarship. 
II. Economic reasoning in court  
Before proceeding to substantiate our claim that Brazilian judges have increasingly 
employed economic reasoning in their opinions, we should clarify what we mean by the 
use of economic reasoning by Brazilian courts. For these purposes, it is helpful to begin by 
clarifying what it is not.  
First, the use of economic reasoning in court is not to be confused with the 
recognition that certain legal developments are at least partially influenced by economic 
considerations.20 This should be a fairly uncontroversial proposition even in civil-law 
jurisdictions. Prominent civil law scholars have long explained the evolution of key legal 
institutions and rules as practical responses to shifting economic needs.21 Also, it is no 
secret that a number of legal rules (such as the legal restrictions to self-contracting and self-
dealing under Brazil’s civil and corporate law, among many others) are based on the 
behavioral assumption that individuals act as self-interested maximizers of their own utility 




Moreover, economic concepts such as monopoly, markets, and competition are known to 
be an integral part of antitrust law.22  
Still, the fact that a legal rule is inspired by economic considerations does not 
necessarily entail the use of economic reasoning by courts. When a judge applies the 
Brazilian Civil Code to deem void a non-authorized sales contract entered into between an 
attorney (representing the principal) and the same attorney, economic reasoning will most 
likely be absent from her decision23 – and appropriately so. In most cases where economic 
considerations are embedded in legal rules, the usual tenets of legal reasoning and 
interpretation will still suffice in their application.  
Second, it is also important to distinguish the use of economic reasoning by 
Brazilian courts from the original aspirations of the law and economics movement of U.S. 
lineage.24 As articulated by Richard Posner, “economic analysis can illuminate, reveal as 
coherent, and in places improve [the law].”25 These are academic ambitions of both 
descriptive and normative character – the chief idea being that economics can be used both 
to explain the underlying logic of the law and to evaluate whether the current legal regime 
is desirable from a cost-benefit standpoint. Accordingly, such a project has been widely 
criticized as subordinating or subsuming the law to economics.26  
Conversely, the use of economic reasoning by Brazilian courts is the appropriation 
of key tenets or lessons from economics (especially microeconomics) as an instrument for 
the application of the mandates contained in preexisting legal principles or rules.27 
Economic insights become especially useful when the legal principles or rules in question 




is thus at the service of the law, not the other way around. In this context, the concept of 
economic efficiency carries comparatively little weight.28  
For a simple illustration of such use, consider the well-established rule that the 
victim of an unlawful act is entitled to recover lost profits (lucrum cessans). The rule 
requires monetary damages to be fixed so as to put the aggrieved party in the position it 
would have been but for the unlawful act.29 The concrete application of this rule thus calls 
for a prediction of what the victim’s profits would have been had the unlawful act not been 
committed. And yet the law provides no theory of human behavior on which to ground 
such a prediction. Be it viewed as a science, an art or a social practice, legal thinking is 
essentially normative in character: it speaks about what ought to be, but has comparatively 
little to say about how the social world works – which is precisely the province of 
economics as well as of other social sciences. 
In the Special Appeal 771,787, the issue before Brazil’s Superior Court of Justice 
(Superior Tribunal de Justiça – STJ)30 was whether the government’s imposition of price 
ceilings on sugar cane derivatives below the actual cost of production was unlawful and, if 
so, what the appropriate measure of damages payable to the aggrieved producers should 
be.31 In approaching these issues, the dissenting opinion by Justice Herman Benjamin 
relied squarely on economic lessons. Specifically, the opinion rejected the measure of 
damages claimed by the plaintiffs, which was calculated solely based on the difference 
between the price ceiling imposed by the government and what the price would have been 
had it been duly fixed according to the actual costs of production.  
Quoting basic lessons from a Portuguese law-and-economics textbook on the 




overestimate the amount of damages, since the artificially low price likely increased the 
amount of the product sold. 32 As the Justice himself emphasized, such use of economic 
insights was instrumental to the application of the law. In his words, although his analysis 
“resorted to economic tools and concepts in its interpretative effort,” it was “purely legal” 
in nature.33  
The simple, almost trivial, example above is however illustrative of a broader trend. 
In this case, as in others, the use of economics explicitly replaces more intuitive forms of 
reasoning or rules of thumb. An important – and, we shall argue in Part IV, growing – 
number of legal norms in Brazil require adjudicators to ponder over the likely factual 
consequences of different events or legal regimes. Although the trend is partly driven by 
advancements in economic theory vis-à-vis the distant past (as is the case in the more 
nuanced application of the ancient legal concept of lost profits), it was significantly 
bolstered by a transformation in the underlying structure of the legal system. 
Indeed, the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF) has 
expressly asserted that correcting a “forecast error by the legislator” is a legitimate ground 
for judicial review.34 But then again, the business of forecasts falls outside the scope of the 
law’s essentially normative enterprise. In order to fulfill such a task, judges face a choice 
between resorting to common sense or personal experience on how the world works35 or 
employing more systematic knowledge generated by the social sciences, such as 
economics.  
With these qualifications in mind, we now turn to an overview of the different forms 
by which economic reasoning has made an appearance in Brazilian judicial decisions. Our 




legal standpoint. Economics, like law, only seldom provides definitive or uncontroversial 
answers to any given problem.  
We also do not make an attempt to systematically quantify the incidence of 
economic arguments in Brazilian judicial decisions, though the fact that the opinions 
described here come from important cases decided by Brazil’s most prominent courts 
suggest that they are not mere rarities or aberrations. Evidently, most court opinions, in 
Brazil as elsewhere, do not resort to economic arguments, and for good reasons. Our goal 
is rather to show that Brazilian judges are not nearly as hostile to economic reasoning as 
one might have thought, and to offer an account of why that is increasingly the case. 
III. Usage of economics by Brazilian courts 
 A. The application of constitutional principles  
 A particularly fertile, if surprising, area for the use of economic reasoning in Brazil 
has been the application of constitutional principles by the Supreme Court. The STF’s 2003 
decision in Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade – 
ADI) 1,946 is illustrative in this regard.36 First, the decision concerned the rare delicate 
case of a constitutional challenge raised against a constitutional amendment. Second, the 
Court’s bold decision to restrict the scope of a literal interpretation of the amendment was 
critically motivated by the use of economic reasoning.  
 The case dealt with the funding of the social right to maternity leave provided by 
the Brazilian constitution. Prior to the amendment, employers were constitutionally and 
legally required to grant eligible women 120 days of maternity leave, but were at the same 
time entitled to obtain reimbursement of the salaries paid during the leave period from 




20 – widely known as the “social security reform” (reforma da previdência) – capped all 
social security payments to the amount of R$1,200 (approximately US$1,000 at the time). 
If the new limit were to apply to maternity leave, any difference between the new ceiling 
and a woman’s actual salary would need to be funded by the employer. The Brazilian 
Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Brasileiro – PSB) filed suit, arguing that the application 
of the cap to maternity leave payments violated the Constitution, in view of its explicit 
provision requiring the “protection of women’s labor market” (Art. VII, XX).  
 The Court’s unanimous opinion written by Justice Sydney Sanches posited that 
shifting the financial burden of maternity leave onto employers would “facilitate and 
stimulate their option for male, instead of female, workers,” so the ceiling would precisely 
“foster the discrimination that the Constitution sought to undercut.”37 The outcome of the 
case was clearly driven by the Court’s forecast of the effects that a literal interpretation of 
the constitutional amendment would have on the rate and form of women participation in 
the workforce. Justice Sanches further emphasized the “perceived lack of adequacy 
between the legal means (a limitation on payments by the social security system and the 
transfer of the burden to the employer) and the normative end established under the 
Constitution to combat the discrimination of women in the labor market.”38 Although the 
decision makes no formal reference to economics, its reasoning is evidently based on a key 
tenet of price theory, driven by the law of supply and demand: namely, that an increase in 
the price of a production input will trigger a reduction in its demand.  
Notice that at no point did the Court ponder about the economic efficiency of 
encouraging women’s participation in the workforce – a theme on which economists’ 




that is, a prior political choice inscribed in the Constitution itself. The role of economics 
was to aid the attainment of a legal objective by providing a theory about the concrete 
effects of different legal regimes.  
Another paradigmatic case involving social rights dealt with the scope of the 
Brazilian statute providing a homestead exemption to the so-called “family home” (bem de 
família), according to which the personal residence of a debtor cannot be foreclosed.40 The 
same statute specifies a number of exceptions to this exemption, including one that 
authorizes foreclosure of the home of a lease guarantor.41 The constitutionality of the 
guarantor exception was challenged before the STF based on the argument that it violated 
the constitutional right to housing (direito à moradia) inserted by Constitutional 
Amendment No. 26 of 2000.  
In affirming the constitutionality of the exception, the majority opinion written by 
Justice Cezar Peluso argued that the right to housing was not synonymous with home 
ownership. Instead, the fact that “there are few property owners in Brazil” justified, in his 
view, the “stimulus to lease arrangements,” which was presumably achieved by the 
challenged exception.42 Justice Peluso’s opinion concluded that eliminating the exception 
“would disrupt market equilibrium, systematically requiring costlier kinds of guarantees 
for residential leases, thereby harming the constitutional right to housing.”43 The opinion 
not only alludes to facts that are apparently outside the scope of the legal rule in question 
(such as the proportion of Brazilians that do not own real property), but also implicitly 
employs a standard model of supply and demand to infer causality between the 
interpretation of the law by the Supreme Court and the available supply of residential 




 The use of economic reasoning in the decisions above – with a particular focus on 
the incentives structure generated by different rules – was by no means exceptional in STF 
jurisprudence. In its 2013 decision in Reclamação 4,374, the STF reversed its prior ruling 
to deem unconstitutional the statutory provision that excluded welfare payments to the 
elderly whose family earned more than one-fourth of a minimum salary per month. The 
majority opinion by Justice Mendes acknowledged that “it was not up to the Federal 
Supreme Court to assess the political and economic convenience of the sums that can or 
should serve as the basis for measuring poverty.”44 Nevertheless, in deeming the existing 
threshold unconstitutional, the decision not only referred to the changes in legal and 
economic conditions since the Court’s original ruling, but also to the fact that the current 
system “ends up discouraging contributions to the social security system, further increasing 
informality.”45  
An even more explicit use of incentives rhetoric took place in the decision of ADI 
4,425, in which the STF found unconstitutional a number of provisions of Constitutional 
Amendment No. 62 of 2009, which addressed the system of enforcement of monetary 
judgments against the State (precatório). Among the amendment’s innovations was the 
ability of the government to institute a reverse auction, which would permit private parties 
to escape the lengthy line to receive payment by agreeing to receive a haircut. The majority 
opinion written by Justice Luiz Fux maintained that “the existence of a reverse auction 
system would represent an incentive for the State not to perform its obligations, aggravating 
the illiquidity of the judgments and increasing the discount (…). In other words: the system 




the Constitution.”46 Similar decisions employing the language of incentives to reach 
constitutional law conclusions abound, being far too numerous to be described in full.  
 In other cases, the STF went so far as to draw specific inferences about the 
implications of certain legal institutions for Brazil’s economic development more 
generally. In the AgReg 5,206-7, decided in 2001, the question was whether Brazil’s 
Arbitration Law of 1996 – which sought to regulate and enforce the contractual parties’ 
agreement to submit their disputes to arbitration – was valid in view of the constitutional 
rule that “the law shall not exclude from judicial appraisal any violation or threat to a right” 
(Art. 5, XXXV). Concluding that the Arbitration Law passed constitutional muster, Justice 
Ilmar Galvão explicitly reasoned that the observed “avalanche of lawsuits” in the judiciary, 
combined with a “slowness that surpassed maximum tolerable limits,” constituted a 
“serious disincentive to business, precisely in a moment in which one expects a sharp 
increment in business activities among us, especially due to the celebrated flows of foreign 
capital in view of exploring new enterprises of an economic nature.” In this context, he 
argued, “the Brazilian legislator came up with the alternative of an Arbitral Tribunal as a 
solution for this serious problem, aiming to ensure the country’s economic development.” 
47   
In the same vein is the opinion of Justice Joaquim Barbosa in ADI 1,194, which 
challenged, inter alia, the provision of the Statute of the Brazilian Bar Association 
(Estatuto da OAB) attributing to the lawyer of the winning party of a lawsuit the judicial 
award of attorney’s fees. The Justice concluded that the destination of the award of 
attorney’s fees shall be a matter of freedom of contract, a solution which “not only unlocks 




rationality, which are fundamental for the country’s growth, to apply, without 
discrimination, to lawyers, in the same way that they apply to other categories of 
professionals.”48 Similarly, in the Extraordinary Appeal 422,941, the reporting Justice 
Carlos Velloso claimed that the government’s imposition of price ceilings below the cost 
of production “constituted a serious obstacle to the exercise of economic activity, in 
violation of the principle of free enterprise.” 49 He added that the “establishment of well-
defined rules of state intervention in the economy, and their compliance, are fundamental 
for the maturation of Brazilian institutions and market, ensuring the necessary economic 
stability that conduces to national development.”50  
Moreover, there are decisions in which different Justices employ economic 
reasoning to reach disparate conclusions. In ADI 4,167, one of the questions before the 
Court was the scope of the expression salary “floor” for elementary school teachers, as 
specified by a new federal statute applicable to all Brazilian states. Justice Joaquim Barbosa 
argued that the term floor “can be interpreted in accordance with the intention of 
strengthening and improving public education services.”51 He then argued that “adequate 
compensation of teachers and other education professionals is one of the useful 
mechanisms for the attainment of such objective.”52 In his view, “if the floor comprises the 
teacher’s global remuneration, the additional payments (gratificação) may equal or exceed 
the minimum, so as to annul or mitigate the incentives for the diligent professional,”53 
hence resulting in the “perceptible deterrence to the incentive and responsibility policies 
that are necessary for the provision of quality educational services by the State based in a 




Conversely, Justice Gilmar Mendes contended that the interpretation of floor as 
synonymous with basic salary, as advocated by Justice Barbosa, could lead to the 
“impossibility of expansion of education services,”55 due to a substantial increase in teacher 
compensation. Moreover, he reasoned, such an interpretation would create an incentive for 
the states to restructure existing compensation packages so as to eliminate any bonus 
payments in addition to the basic salary – a conclusion which, in his words, derived from 
“pure game theory.”56    
B. Teleological or purposive interpretation of statutes  
 The STF is however not alone in resorting to economic lessons in its opinions. 
Economic reasoning is also prevalent in the decisions of the STJ. The use of economic 
insight is particularly noticeable when the Court employs a teleological or purposive 
method of statutory interpretation, a method with a long pedigree in the Western tradition.57  
For instance, in the early 2000s, the STJ had to determine the scope of Art. 6 of the 
statute regulating the concession of public services.58 The rule in question expressly 
allowed concessionaires to suspend the provision of public services to clients in default. 
The question before the court was whether the rule applied to the provision of “essential 
services,” such as water, gas or energy, given that Art. 22 of the Brazilian Consumer 
Protection Code59 requires utilities to provide essential services in a “continuous” fashion. 
The majority opinion by Justice Gomes de Barros repudiated the interpretation that 
prevented concessionaires from suspending the provision of services, a regime which, in 
his view, would generate a “domino effect.”60 Indeed, he maintained, “in finding out that 




tempting benefit.”61 The result would be that “soon enough, nobody will honor the 
electricity bill.”62  
The STJ has also recently resorted to economic reasoning in interpreting Brazil’s 
consumer protection law, so as not to hurt the people the law is trying to help.63 In the 
Special Appeal 1,232,795, the issue before the Court was whether the company operating 
a private parking law was liable for the armed robbery of a client inside its facilities. The 
unanimous opinion written by Justice Nancy Andrighi stated that no such liability existed, 
among other reasons, because assigning this burden to private parking lots would also be 
detrimental to consumers, for they would require investments that “would certainly reflect 
upon the price of the [parking] service, which is already high.”64  
C. Citations to academic works 
While most uses of economic reasoning by Brazilian are implicit in nature, this is 
not always the case. Indeed, there are numerous court decisions – from all levels of the 
judiciary – that explicitly cite works by economists or law and economics scholars. For 
instance, in ruling at ADI 2,340 that a state law could not obligate municipalities to provide 
water with water trunks whenever the regular provision of water was suspended, STF 
Justice Gilmar Mendes reasoned that “the service of basic sanitation is a natural monopoly 
[…] rendering interstate competition not only impracticable, but also suggesting that the 
consolidation of demand from neighbor cities can reduce costs and render the service more 
attractive to private concessionaires.”65 The same opinion expressly relies on the concept 
of natural monopoly as described in the books Law & Economics, by Robert Cooter and 
Thomas Ulen, and Economic Analysis of Law, by Richard Posner. On another occasion, 




possible effects of disparate tax regimes “on the offer of products on the spare parts market, 
with a relevant impact on market equilibrium, internal consumption and inflation.”66 
In citing economics bibliography, Justice Gilmar Mendes – who, before joining the 
Court, was a distinguished constitutional law scholar who obtained his PhD in Germany – 
is not an outlier. Economic lessons also made their way into the STF decision in ADI 3,510, 
the high-profile constitutional challenge against Brazil’s Biosecurity Law, which regulates 
stem cell research. In his dissenting opinion on the unconstitutionality of stem cell research, 
Justice Cezar Peluso underscored what he viewed as flaws in the enforcement devices 
outlined by the statute.  He argued that the mechanism for the appointment of members of 
a certain Committee of Ethics and Research was deficient because its composition was to 
be determined by the respective research institution. In his view, “this rule entails, at least, 
a serious risk of what economic theory calls an agency problem, that is, a critical conflict 
of interest that harms the independency of the entity immediately responsible for ensuring 
the zealous adherence of the grave constitutional and legal restrictions of the authorized 
research.” He then goes on to quote a definition of the principle-agent problem from Joseph 
Stiglitz’s book on the Economics of the Public Sector.67  
State courts have also directly cited law and economics scholarship. In a recent 
decision by the Court of Appeals of the State of São Paulo, the issue was whether a shop 
had recourse against a credit card company for a purchase later cancelled due to fraud. 
Specifically, an appliances store had sold an air conditioner to a client who paid with a 
cloned credit card. The true holder of the credit card requested the cancellation of the 
purchase, which the credit card company did and then denied payment to the appliances 




contract clause excluding liability of the credit card company in such instances was 
“abusive” and, therefore, void. 
In upholding the exclusion of liability, and effectively assigning the loss to the shop, 
Judge Andrade Marques used law and economics scholarship to shed light on the rationale 
behind the contract clause. He argued that, at least with respect to face-to-face sales, “in 
comparison with the credit card company, the merchant has greater capacity to control and 
prevent the risk of trickery by customers. In other words, the seller is the superior risk 
bearer in this contractual relationship.”68 After a short digression about the concept of good 
faith in the Brazilian Civil Code, the opinion directly quoted a passage from George 
Triantis’s entry on “Risk Allocation in Contracts” from the Encyclopedia of Law & 
Economics, which describes in detail the concept of a superior risk bearer. The opinion 
then went on to conclude that “the assignment of risks to the superior risk bearer is more 
efficient from an economic standpoint because this is the party that can avoid and mitigate 
the risk at a lower cost.”69  
In another decision concerning a damages claim against a company that had 
outsourced its transportation services, Judge Marcelo Banacchio of the Court of Appeals 
of the State of São Paulo cites the famous opus by Cooter and Ulen to ground his 
observation that in its business activities a company “constantly balances costs against 
means to seek profits, of which outsourcing some of its crucial activities are an example, 
and in so doing it considers marginal costs, among which lies the payment of damages, it 
being understood that the optimal activity level will take place whenever precautionary 
costs are lower than the [expected] payment of caused damages.”70 He then concludes that 




the possibility of damages and their internalization within the productive process, meaning 
that if the outsourced activity such as the one at hand generates more losses than profits it 
will certainly [...] be discarded [by the company]”.71 Likewise, in a dissenting opinion that 
deemed valid the administrative proceeding that summoned only the legal representative 
of a company (and not all of its partners, as defended by the plaintiffs), Judge Beretta da 
Silveira from the Court of Appeals of the State of São Paulo, stated that “it is worth 
recalling the doctrine of prominent Law & Economics scholar Richard Posner, according 
to which one should consider balance of costs/benefits involved in judicial decisions.”72  
Brazilian judges have also expressly referred to prominent figures of the law and 
economics literature. In ruling on the value of damages to be paid by a news company, 
Justice Nancy Andrighi, of the Superior Court of Justice, cited Richard Posner and Robert 
Bork in support of the proposition that “in deciding on whether to publish a defamation, [a 
news company] takes into account, on one hand, the damages established in court and, on 
the other hand, the expected income that such publication will bring.”73 Justice Andrighi 
then concluded that “in establishing the damages the judge shall take into account the 
income of the news company with the unlawful act, for otherwise it will stimulate those 
that seek to maximize their profit to the detriment of society as a whole.”74 Nothing could 
be closer to the familiar notion within law and economics literature that a company’s 
calculation for profit maximization is influenced by the prospects of legal sanctions and 
rewards,75 and that a judge should be forward looking while calibrating her decisions.76 
Richard Posner is cited by several other court decisions. In finding that the 
exclusivity requirement imposed by a doctors’ cooperative was unlawful under Brazil’s 




quoting a long passage in English from Richard Posner’s classic, Economic Analysis of 
Law.77 In rejecting the filing of a “rescissory action” (ação rescisória),78 Judge Osvaldo 
Cruz, of the Court of Appeals of the State of Rio Grande do Norte, refers to the works of 
Ronald Coase and Richard Posner to argue that “the judge must pay attention to the 
economic incentives and disincentives produced by court precedents.”79 All of the 
preceding cases are merely illustrative, rather than exhaustive. It is possible to find various 
other court decisions citing law and economics scholars or containing sparse references to 
“economic analysis of law” or the “law and economics” movement.80  
IV. The vectors for increased legal demand for economic reasoning in Brazil 
 The previous section revealed that economic reasoning is no stranger to at least a 
part of Brazil’s judiciary. This is emphatically not to deny that there are judges who are 
completely oblivious to economic thinking. But the various decisions documented above, 
which implicitly or explicitly rely on economic lessons to solve legal problems, are 
surprising, not only in light of conventional wisdom, but also of the hurdles that had to be 
overcome for these arguments to surface: namely, the lack of in-depth economic training 
by the vast majority of Brazilian judges,81 the dearth of instruction in law and economics 
in law schools, the relative scarcity of law and economics scholarship in Portuguese 
language, and the rarity of studies applying economic insights to problems specific to 
Brazilian law.  
Our basic hypothesis is that contemporary Brazilian law is particularly amenable to 
economic reasoning for related and mutually reinforcing (i) ideological, (ii) political, and 




A.  The ideological vector: the rise of progressivism 
The first vector is the ascent of progressive ideology as the underpinning of the 
modern Brazilian state. Progressivism – here, loosely understood as the antithesis of 
conservatism83 – is the ideology of advancement and development, which is based on a 
strong belief in human capacity to effectively alter reality and ameliorate human condition. 
In Brazil, the rise to power of Getulio Vargas marked the triumph of progressivism as the 
dominant state ideology, which is one that resorts to the “instrumental use of law” as a tool 
for “social engineering.”84 While conservatism typically presupposes the wisdom 
embedded in existing rules and institutions, progressive ideology constantly puts it to test.85  
The state that embraces the mission of actively ordering and perfecting society – 
the regulatory state – is the institutional incarnation of progressive ideology. Brazil’s 
Constitution of 1988 is far from timid about its progressive ambitions. Article 3 explicitly 
articulates that “ensuring national development,” “eliminating poverty and 
marginalization, and reducing social and regional inequalities,” as well as “promoting the 
well-being of all” are “fundamental objectives of the Federative Republic of Brazil.”  
Brazil’s regulatory state is significantly involved in the pursuit of a series of 
concrete objectives or public policies – be they the elimination of illiteracy or the reduction 
of pollution. The formulation and implementation of public policies, in turn, create the 
need of tailoring legal instruments and solutions to the goals of achieving concrete 
normative ends. In order to accomplish such a task, the traditional techniques of legal 
reasoning – based exclusively on grammar, history, logic, and internal coherence – no 
longer suffice. Once the legal ends are given, the legal debate turns to the question of the 




The legal controversy involving Law 11,340 of 2006 (“Lei Maria da Penha”) – a 
statute that, according to its preamble, was designed to create “mechanisms for deterring 
domestic and familial violence against women” – is illustrative of these types of challenges. 
The main legal debate surrounding the statute did not lie in the legitimacy of its objectives 
(which were fairly uncontroversial86), but in whether the mechanisms provided by the 
statute were consistent with such goals. Accordingly, the STF had to decide on the 
constitutionality of the statutory provision that conditioned the criminal prosecution of 
wrongdoers to the “representation” (request) of the victim.  
In a split decision, the Court ultimately decided to grant an interpretation “in 
accordance with the constitution” to the effect of permitting the criminal prosecution of 
offenders notwithstanding the absence of representation by the victim. The court’s majority 
considered women’s well-known reluctance to file representations against their spouses, 
and concluded that the imposition of such requirement would effectively “eliminate the 
constitutional protection afforded to women,”87 thus making it particularly inept to 
accomplish the desired objective of curbing domestic violence. Tellingly, the disagreement 
expressed in Justice Cezar Peluso’s dissenting opinion concerned precisely the presumed 
concrete factual consequences of mandating or dispensing the victim’s representation – the 
type of inference that is typical of social sciences such as economics, but foreign to 
traditional legal reasoning.88 A behavioral theory – such as that offered by economics and 





B.  The political vector: the ascent of the judiciary 
The growing demand by lawyers and judges for theories of human behavior is due 
not only to the widespread pursuit of public policies by the regulatory state, but also and 
especially by the ever greater role of courts in the formulation and implementation of such 
policies. Since 1988 the judiciary shifted from the periphery to the center of political power 
in Brazil.89 Following redemocratization, the STF took on the role of arbiter of the 
country’s great institutional and political conflicts, a function previously exercised by the 
armed forces. Oscar Vilhena Vieira aptly termed the country’s current regime as a 
“supremocracy.”90 
The worldwide trend toward the expansion of judicial power assumed a particularly 
extreme configuration in Brazil. The avenues for judicial review of legislation – which is 
arguably the principal mechanism for courts’ interference in policymaking – are 
exceptionally broad. Whereas the vast majority of jurisdictions adopt either concentrated 
or diffuse modes of judicial review (that is, when they do not fail to recognize ex post 
judicial review altogether),91 Brazilian law contemplates both forms of constitutional 
challenges to legislation.92 This hybrid system, combined with a long, detailed, and 
ambitious constitution,93 creates enormous leeway for judicial protagonism.    
This new prominence of the judicial branch in public policymaking has not gone 
unnoticed, and has triggered related innovations in institutional design. Law 9,868 of 1999, 
which regulates the procedure for concentrated judicial review, innovates by permitting the 
STF to call “public hearings” (audiências públicas) to hear “the testimonies of persons 
with experience and expertise on the subject.” By admitting public hearings before the 




policymaking arenas, such as the legislature and administrative agencies –, the statute both 
underscores and reinforces the court’s role in shaping public policy.  
This function, indeed, is ever more explicit. Breaking with the classical separation 
of powers94 and the archetypical conceptions of the role of courts in civil-law jurisdictions, 
the STF is at present constitutionally empowered both to issue “binding statements” 
(súmulas vinculantes) that must be followed by lower courts and other branches of 
government and to pick its cases based on what it deems to be their “general 
repercussion.”95 Law 11,418 of 2006 defines “general repercussion” as the “relevant 
questions from an economic, political, social and legal standpoint that transcend the 
subjective interests of the case.”96 It should come as no surprise that, having been asked 
explicitly by the legislature to factor economic considerations into their decisions, the STF 
has obliged.  
C.  The legal vector: the changing structure of law 
Finally, the greater judicial role in policymaking does not operate in a legal vacuum. 
On the contrary, it should come as no surprise that, under a rule of law regime, the growth 
in the power of the judiciary was accompanied by changes in the structure of legal rules. 
These changes, in turn, create increasing demand for economic reasoning in two ways: by 
directly incorporating economic consequences into the content of legal rules and by 
rendering the application of a given legal regime conditional on the desirability of its 
consequences.  
In its canonical form, a legal rule contains both a description of a (past) fact and its 
legal consequences. Article 121 of Brazil’s Criminal Code offers a representative example: 




might be useful in determining whether such a rule is desirable before its enactment by the 
legislature, but it plays at best a modest role in its concrete adjudication. The main tasks 
before the decisionmaker are interpretative and evidentiary in nature: circumscribing the 
meaning of the rule’s wording (i.e.: What is the meaning of killing? What is the meaning 
of someone?) and determining whether the fact described in abstract form therein has in 
fact materialized (by resorting to standard evidentiary procedures). Although legal rules 
adhering to such a structure continue to exist – and, indeed, should continue to exist –, a 
growing number of legal commands follow a different model which is far more conducive 
to economic thinking.  
First, there is a greater incidence of legal rules that prescribe sanctions that, instead 
of invariably applying to certain past facts, will apply or not depending on the possible 
consequences of facts. This latter technique has, in fact, become the hallmark of modern 
antitrust law, which originated in the United States and then quickly spread to other 
jurisdictions, including Brazil. In lieu of so-called per se rules (which followed the classic 
legal rule structure of assigning sanctions to certain predetermined factual descriptions), 
virtually all conducts that receive competition law scrutiny are now subject to what is 
known in the United States as “the rule of reason” standard and in Europe by the more 
descriptive label of “effects-based analysis.”97  
The recent change in the legal treatment of the commercial practice of minimum 
“resale price maintenance” in distribution agreements in the United States illustrates this 
point. While the practice agreement used to be illegal in all circumstances, it is now subject 
to the rule of reason, which means that the restriction will be permitted or not depending 




Economic analysis therefore becomes essential for the application of such rules, since 
traditional legal methods of interpretation are of little help in ascertaining the actual market 
effects of any given conduct.  
Second, and more importantly, the contours and methods for the application of legal 
principles also depart from those of a canonical legal rule. It is well known fact that legal 
principles, as opposed to legal rules, have become increasingly influential in the 
adjudication of legal disputes, in Brazil as elsewhere.99 But legal rules and legal principles 
have a markedly different structure. While legal rules are norms that “immediately describe 
behavior,” legal principles are norms that “instead of describing behavior, establish an 
‘ideal state of affairs’ (that is, an objective) whose realization implies the adoption of 
certain behaviors.”100 Under Robert Alexy’s influential definition, legal principles are 
“optimization mandates,” that is, norms that direct the realization of a value or objective to 
the greatest extent possible given the existing legal and factual constraints.101 
Following the German tradition, the most popular test for deciding conflicts 
between legal principles in Brazil is that of “proportionality.” The application of 
proportionality test, in turn, incorporates to legal decisionmaking elements traditionally 
viewed as “nonlegal,” since they pertain to the possible factual consequences of different 
regimes. In its conventional formulation, proportionality requires the decisionmaker to 
scrutinize different dimensions of the regime in question: (i) its suitability (does the means 
promote the end?), (ii) necessity (among all available means equally apt to promote the 
end, are there other means that are less restrictive to the affected fundamental rights), and 
(iii) proportionality in the narrow sense (do the advantages relating to the promotion of the 




question?).”102  In a significant number of cases, answering the questions posed by the 
proportionality test requires a style of reasoning that is fundamentally different from 
merely interpretative or deductive endeavors. It is often necessary to resort to a theory of 
human behavior to predict if a certain measure is adequate or necessary to promote the 
means.  
In sum, the application of a canonical legal rule requires the determination of 
whether a fact has occurred, leaving generally little room for economic analysis in its 
adjudication. Effects-based rules, by contrast, condition the application of legal sanctions 
on a finding about the likely factual consequences of a given fact or conduct – an inference 
for which economic reasoning is very helpful, if not utterly indispensable. The application 
of legal principles, in turn, depends on the evaluation of the likely factual consequences, 
not of a fact, but of the application of the norm itself.   
Put differently, this means that the distinctive trait of the legal system vis-à-vis other 
systems – the focus on discerning between what is lawful and what is unlawful103 – can no 
longer be readily addressed by appealing to purely abstract or theoretical interpretation of 
legal norms. Probabilistic judgments about the likely effects of different legal regimes are 
increasingly indispensable. These, in turn, are empirical questions for which the law itself 
provides no ready answer – but with respect to which the social sciences can be of 
considerable assistance.  
In other words, the presumed consequences of one or another legal regime will 
ultimately determine the weight afforded to different principles in a given case. In this 




but not limited to, economics – in order to evaluate the probable effects of different legal 
regimes with a minimum degree of rationality.  
V.  Conclusion 
The preceding analysis showed that the conventional assumption that economic 
reasoning is absent from legal practice in Brazil is flawed. Brazilian judges habitually and 
overtly employ concepts borrowed from economics to forecast the likely consequences of 
events or rules when such a prediction is called for by the relevant legal norms. As such, 
economics is at the service of law, not the other way around. Consequently, the Brazilian 
court system cannot be deemed to be undergoing the much-feared process of intellectual 
“colonization” by economics in any meaningful way.  
Neither are Brazilian courts undergoing a process of ideological colonization. 
Whatever the merits of the claim that law and economics has a conservative bias, the 
Brazilian case highlights the potential of using economics to further progressive legal 
objectives as well. At least in the Brazilian context, economics works more like a knife 
(that can cut both ways) than as rhetorical platform that is inexorably linked to a certain 
political agenda. 
Admittedly, we make no attempt to articulate the precise place of economic 
reasoning inside legal discourse, a deep philosophical topic that far exceeds the aims of 
this article. Neither do we delve into the intricate relationship between the use of economic 
reasoning and the resulting quality of legal adjudication. Rather, we conclude by briefly 
reflecting on the implications of our findings to legal education and scholarship.  
If, as suggested above, the use of economic reasoning as part of legal analysis is a 




system, demand for law and economics scholarship in Brazil seems to be there to stay. 
And, given that the traditional role of legal scholarship in civil law countries is both to 
explain and to assist in the application of the law, we expect to see a corresponding rise in 
the pursuit of law and economics studies by the legal academy, both in terms of research 
and teaching.  
Finally, we have no reason to believe that the ideological, political, and legal factors 
that have increased demand for law and economics knowledge by courts are unique to 
Brazil. We can thus speculate that it is not only in Brazil that analysts have been looking 
at the wrong places in their apparently fruitless search for integration of economic analysis 
into the law. This suggests that the future of law and economics scholarship in civil-law 
jurisdictions more generally rests on the understanding that this line of inquiry is 
increasingly consistent with the traditional vocation of civilian jurists of producing work 
that is instrumental in the application of the law.   
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